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Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values
Book chapter   Open access   Peer reviewed

Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values

Vasilis Gkatzelis, Rishi Patel, Emmanouil Pountourakis and Daniel Schoepflin
Algorithmic Game Theory, pp 64-78
14 Sep 2021
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3_5
url
http://arxiv.org/abs/2107.09247View
SubmittedOpen Access (License Unspecified),  Open

Abstract

Clock auctions Interdependent values Obvious ex-post equilibrium
We study the problem of selling a good to a group of bidders with interdependent values in a prior-free setting. Each bidder has a signal that can take one of k different values, and her value for the good is a weakly increasing function of all the bidders’ signals. The bidders are partitioned into ℓ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\ell $$\end{document} expertise-groups, based on how their signal can impact the values for the good, and we prove upper and lower bounds regarding the approximability of social welfare and revenue for a variety of settings, parameterized by k and ℓ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\ell $$\end{document}. Our lower bounds apply to all ex-post incentive compatible mechanisms and our upper bounds are all within a small constant of the lower bounds. Our main results take the appealing form of ascending clock auctions and provide strong incentives by admitting the desired outcomes as obvious ex-post equilibria.

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