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Epistemic Responsibility and Democratic Justification: Robert B. Talisse: Democracy and Moral Conflict. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, 216 pp
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Epistemic Responsibility and Democratic Justification: Robert B. Talisse: Democracy and Moral Conflict. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, 216 pp

Andrew Smith
Res Publica, v 17(3), pp 297-302
Aug 2011

Abstract

Philosophy of Law Philosophy of Religion Ethics Philosophy Political Philosophy
Many political philosophers tend to take it as given that the justification for democracy rests upon specifying a set of moral commitments that all citizens reasonably can be expected to accept.Footnote1 Sufficient agreement about these commitments is often treated, as Cristina Lafont puts it, as ‘the very condition for the possibility of democracy’ (2009, 130). If this is correct then, without such agreement, the legitimacy of democracy—which depends upon the assent of all who are subject to the state’s coercive power—seemingly cannot be secured. [1st paragraph]

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