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Deferred-Acceptance Auctions for Multiple Levels of Service
Conference proceeding   Open access

Deferred-Acceptance Auctions for Multiple Levels of Service

Vasilis Gkatzelis, Evangelos Markakis, Tim Roughgarden and Assoc Comp Machinery
EC'17: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2017 ACM CONFERENCE ON ECONOMICS AND COMPUTATION, pp 21-38
01 Jan 2017
url
https://doi.org/10.1145/3033274.3085142View
Published, Version of Record (VoR)Maybe Open Access (Publisher Bronze) Open

Abstract

Business & Economics Computer Science Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence Computer Science, Theory & Methods Economics Mathematics Mathematics, Applied Operations Research & Management Science Physical Sciences Science & Technology Social Sciences Technology
Deferred-acceptance (DA) auctions are mechanisms that are based on backward-greedy algorithms and possess a number of remarkable incentive properties, including implementation as an obviously-strategyproof ascending auction. All existing work on DA auctions considers only binary single-parameter problems, where each bidder either "wins" or "loses." This paper generalizes the DA auction framework to non-binary settings, and applies this generalized framework to obtain approximately welfare-maximizing DA auctions for a number of basic mechanism design problems: multiunit auctions, problems with polymatroid constraints or multiple knapsack constraints, and the problem of scheduling jobs to minimize their total weighted completion time. Our results require the design of novel backward-greedy algorithms with good approximation guarantees.

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16 citations in Scopus

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#10 Reduced Inequalities

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Collaboration types
Domestic collaboration
International collaboration
Web of Science research areas
Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence
Computer Science, Theory & Methods
Economics
Mathematics, Applied
Operations Research & Management Science
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