We design online algorithms for the fair allocation of public goods to a set of N agents over a sequence of T rounds and focus on improving their performance using predictions. In the basic model, a public good arrives in each round, and every agent reveals their value for it upon arrival. The algorithm must irrevocably decide the investment in this good without exceeding a total budget of B across all rounds. The algorithm can utilize (potentially noisy) predictions of each agent's total value for all remaining goods. The algorithm's performance is measured using a proportional fairness objective, which informally demands that every group of agents be rewarded proportional to its size and the cohesiveness of its preferences. We show that no algorithm can achieve better than Theta(T/B) proportional fairness without predictions. With reasonably accurate predictions, the situation improves significantly, and Theta(log(T/B)) proportional fairness is achieved. We also extend our results to a general setting wherein a batch of L public goods arrive in each round and O(log(min(N, L) center dot T/B)) proportional fairness is achieved. Our exact bounds are parameterized as a function of the prediction error, with performance degrading gracefully with increasing errors.
Proportionally Fair Online Allocation of Public Goods with Predictions
Creators
Siddhartha Banerjee - Cornell University
Vasilis Gkatzelis - Drexel University
Safwan Hossain - Harvard University
Billy Jin - Cornell University
Evi Micha - University of Toronto
Nisarg Shah - University of Toronto
Contributors
E Elkind (Editor)
Publication Details
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SECOND INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, IJCAI 2023, pp 20-28
Conference
THIRTY-SECOND INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, IJCAI 2023, 32nd
Publisher
Ijcai-Int Joint Conf Artif Intell
Number of pages
9
Grant note
CCF 2047907 / NSF CAREER award; National Science Foundation (NSF); NSF - Office of the Director (OD)
PGSD3-532673-2019 / NSERC fellowship; Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC)
ECCS-1847393 / NSF; National Science Foundation (NSF)
Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing
FA9550-23-1-0068 / AFOSR; United States Department of Defense; Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR)
NSERC Discovery Grant; Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC)
Resource Type
Conference proceeding
Language
English
Academic Unit
Computer Science
Web of Science ID
WOS:001202344200003
Scopus ID
2-s2.0-85165185675
Other Identifier
991021897307804721
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