Conference proceeding
Revisiting Physical-World Adversarial Attack on Traffic Sign Recognition: A Commercial Systems Perspective
Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS) Symposium
01 Jan 2025
Abstract
Traffic Sign Recognition (TSR) is crucial for safe and correct driving automation. Recent works revealed a general vulnerability of TSR models to physical-world adversarial attacks, which can be low-cost, highly deployable, and capable of causing severe attack effects such as hiding a critical traffic sign or spoofing a fake one. However, so far existing works generally only considered evaluating the attack effects on academic TSR models, leaving the impacts of such attacks on real-world commercial TSR systems largely unclear. In this paper, we conduct the first large-scale measurement of physical-world adversarial attacks against commercial TSR systems. Our testing results reveal that it is possible for existing attack works from academia to have highly reliable (100%) attack success against certain commercial TSR system functionality, but such attack capabilities are not generalizable, leading to much lower-than-expected attack success rates overall. We find that one potential major factor is a spatial memorization design that commonly exists in today's commercial TSR systems. We design new attack success metrics that can mathematically model the impacts of such design on the TSR system-level attack success, and use them to revisit existing attacks. Through these efforts, we uncover 7 novel observations, some of which directly challenge the observations or claims in prior works due to the introduction of the new metrics.
Metrics
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Details
- Title
- Revisiting Physical-World Adversarial Attack on Traffic Sign Recognition: A Commercial Systems Perspective
- Creators
- Ningfei Wang - University of California, IrvineShaoyuan Xie - University of California, IrvineTakami Sato - University of California, IrvineYunpeng Luo - University of California, IrvineKaidi Xu - Drexel UniversityQi Alfred Chen - University of California, Irvine
- Publication Details
- Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS) Symposium
- Conference
- 2025 Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS) Symposium (San Diego, California, United States, 24 Feb 2025–28 Feb 2025)
- Publisher
- INTERNET SOC
- Number of pages
- 18
- Grant note
- CNS-1929771; CNS-2145493 / NSF; National Science Foundation (NSF) 69A3552348327 / USDOT CARMEN+ University Transportation Center
- Resource Type
- Conference proceeding
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Computer Science
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:001753028500211
- Other Identifier
- 991022201343804721