The recent surge in litigation involving supposed "repressed memories" has presented legal fact-finders with formidable challenges in sorting out truth from fiction. The lack of resolution in the mental health fields regarding the viability of memory repression and veridical memory recovery has made expert testimony in these areas of questionable value in resolving cases. Jurors are often left with equivocal impressions of both the facts and of the state of scientific knowledge in this area. This circumstance leaves jurors more likely to resolve repressed-memory cases based upon their own predilections and/or prejudices. The current study reviews the history of trial by jury, the historical recognition of jury bias and various attempts to assess and limit its impact. It is asserted that repressed-memory cases represent a unique circumstance in which the risk of verdict being determined by juror bias is greater than in other types of cases. These reasons arise from evidentiary ambiguity deriving from: (a) the length of time between the alleged offense and the claim, (b) the typical absence of eyewitnesses and/or physical evidence and (c) the scientific uncertainty as to the validity of memory recovery, and (d) the emotionally provocative nature of the allegations. The current study employed three variants of a repressed-memory trial vignette based upon an actual trial. One-hundred and twenty jurors (60 men, 60 women) responded to one of the three vignettes, which varied in evidence strength. Jurors also responded to a questionnaire which included demographic, attitudinal, experiential and personality measures. Statistically significant prediction of verdict and ratings of defendant culpability were obtained by evidence strength, belief in repression and media-exposure related views regarding the viability of veridical memory recovery. Marginally significant prediction was obtained for juror child sexual abuse history and juror self-ratings of feminism. Gender was predictive of verdict only in the strong and weak evidentiary conditions. Application of these findings by practicing lawyers and/or judges is discussed. It is asserted that no single variable from this list should be viewed as cause for automatic exclusion of jurors. Rather, some combination of variables, each predicting the same verdict, should be taken as a caution of possible bias in a juror and should prompt closer questioning of that juror as to his or her ability to render a verdict based upon the evidence. Finally, the study further supports previous findings that evidence strength is the strongest determinant of verdict choice.
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Details
Title
Factors affecting juror decisionmaking in repressed-memory cases
Creators
Adam Paul Rosen
Contributors
Donald N. Bersoff (Advisor) - Drexel University, Allegheny University of the Health Sciences (1996-1998)
Awarding Institution
Allegheny University of the Health Sciences; Villanova University, School of Law
Degree Awarded
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)
Publisher
Allegheny University of the Health Sciences; Villanova University, School of Law; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Number of pages
xiii, 247 pages
Resource Type
Dissertation
Language
English
Academic Unit
Allegheny University of the Health Sciences (1996-1998); Clinical and Health Psychology [Historical]; School of Health Professions (1996-1998)
Other Identifier
991021888881104721
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