Dissertation
The effects of corporate litigant counterparties sharing an auditor
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.), Drexel University
May 2019
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17918/pf5b-0194
Abstract
I find economically significant effects to interfirm litigation disclosure and outcomes when both corporate counterparties share the same auditor. Shared auditors have concern to mitigate biased disclosure of an event occurring between their adversarial clients. I find defendant litigants sharing an auditor with their counterparty are more likely to recognize litigation threats in their financial disclosure and are less likely to disclose, expectedly biased, predictive loss estimates. In testing outcomes of litigation, I do not find evidence consistent with shared auditors acting as information intermediaries between counterparties during legal arbitration, which would result in shorter litigation duration or greater likelihood of negotiated settlement. However, I find support for their monitoring role, ex-post litigation, as a mutually shared and trusted agent. This is evidenced by an increased likelihood that settlement contracts include beneficial provisions that extend beyond loss payments (e.g. licensing agreements, partnerships, loans) which are aided by increased monitoring of contractual fulfillment and the application of consistent accounting treatment for contractual terms. Additional tests support these findings.
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Details
- Title
- The effects of corporate litigant counterparties sharing an auditor
- Creators
- Eric Lohwasser Jr. - DU
- Contributors
- Hsihui Chang (Advisor) - Drexel University (1970-)
- Awarding Institution
- Drexel University
- Degree Awarded
- Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)
- Publisher
- Drexel University; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
- Number of pages
- xi, 93 pages
- Resource Type
- Dissertation
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Accounting; Bennett S. LeBow College of Business; Drexel University
- Other Identifier
- 10920; 991014632196704721