Thesis
Maximizing the residual surplus in position auctions
Master of Science (M.S.), Drexel University
Jun 2020
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17918/00000248
Abstract
Mechanism design focuses on designing algorithms to allocate a finite set of resources to a set of strategic agents while maximizing some objective function. This thesis studies mechanisms which maximize residual surplus, which is given as the total value of the allocation chosen minus the payments charged to agents. Specifically, this work describes the design of an optimal mechanism for position auctions, where each agent has a valuation for receiving some service, and agents are allocated some probability of receiving that service. Position auctions most commonly model sponsored search auctions, where the agents are allocated advertisement slots for a web search result and the service provided is a click on the agent's ad. This work defines the truthful Bayesian optimal mechanism for position auctions as a multi-price lottery. It then explores how this could be used to design a prior-free mechanism for position auctions that performs well without the need for the Bayesian assumption by relaxing the more complex lottery to a single-price lottery, and suggests limitations of this approach.
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Details
- Title
- Maximizing the residual surplus in position auctions
- Creators
- Safa T. Aman
- Contributors
- Vasilis Gkatzelis (Advisor)
- Awarding Institution
- Drexel University
- Degree Awarded
- Master of Science (M.S.)
- Publisher
- Drexel University; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
- Number of pages
- vii, 36 pages
- Resource Type
- Thesis
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Computer Science (Computing) (2013-2026); College of Computing and Informatics (2013-2026); Drexel University
- Other Identifier
- 991014695540304721