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SubmittedOpen Access (License Unspecified), Open
Journal article
Against Phenomenal Conservatism
Acta analytica : philosophy and psychology, v 26(3), 213
01 Sep 2011
Abstract
Recently, Michael Huemer has defended the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism: If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p. This principle has potentially far-reaching implications. Huemer uses it to argue against skepticism and to defend a version of ethical intuitionism. I employ a reductio to show that PC is false. If PC is true, beliefs can yield justification for believing their contents in cases where, intuitively, they should not be able to do so. I argue that there are cases where a belief that p can behave like an appearance that p and thereby make it seem to one that p.
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Details
- Title
- Against Phenomenal Conservatism
- Creators
- Nathan Hanna - Lawrence University
- Publication Details
- Acta analytica : philosophy and psychology, v 26(3), 213
- Publisher
- Springer Netherlands
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- English and Philosophy
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:000294068400001
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-80051933438
- Other Identifier
- 991021862238404721
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- Web of Science research areas
- Philosophy