Journal article
Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?
The Journal of finance (New York), v 61(2), pp 689-724
01 Apr 2006
Abstract
Firms with busy boards, those in which a majority of outside directors hold three or more directorships, are associated with weak corporate governance. These firms exhibit lower market-to-book ratios, weaker profitability, and lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance. Independent but busy boards display CEO turnover-performance sensitivities indistinguishable from those of inside-dominated boards. Departures of busy outside directors generate positive abnormal returns (ARs). When directors become busy as a result of acquiring an additional directorship, other companies in which they hold board seats experience negative ARs. Busy outside directors are more likely to depart boards following poor performance. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
Metrics
Details
- Title
- Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?
- Creators
- Eliezer FichAnil Shivdasani
- Publication Details
- The Journal of finance (New York), v 61(2), pp 689-724
- Publisher
- Blackwell Publishers Inc
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Finance
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:000235937200006
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-33644891336
- Other Identifier
- 991019169687504721
InCites Highlights
Data related to this publication, from InCites Benchmarking & Analytics tool:
- Collaboration types
- Domestic collaboration
- Web of Science research areas
- Business, Finance
- Economics