Journal article
Are busy boards detrimental?
Journal of financial economics, v 109(1), pp 63-82
01 Jul 2013
Abstract
Busy directors have been widely criticized as being ineffective. However, we hypothesize that busy directors offer advantages for many firms. While busy directors may be less effective monitors, their experience and contacts arguably make them excellent advisors. Among IPO firms, which have minimal experience with public markets and likely rely heavily on their directors for advising, we find busy boards to be common and to contribute positively to firm value. Moreover, these positive effects of busy boards extend to all but the most established firms. Benefits are lowest among Forbes 500 firms, which likely require more monitoring than advising.
Metrics
Details
- Title
- Are busy boards detrimental?
- Creators
- Laura Field - Pennsylvania State UniversityMichelle Lowry - Pennsylvania State UniversityAnahit Mkrtchyan - Northeastern University
- Publication Details
- Journal of financial economics, v 109(1), pp 63-82
- Publisher
- Elsevier
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Finance
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:000320218300004
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-84892434780
- Other Identifier
- 991021881393204721
InCites Highlights
Data related to this publication, from InCites Benchmarking & Analytics tool:
- Collaboration types
- Domestic collaboration
- Web of Science research areas
- Business, Finance
- Economics