Journal article
Are outside directors with greater board tenure valuable? Evidence from the last credit crisis q
Journal of accounting and public policy, v 42(1)
01 Jan 2023
Abstract
Analyses of bank performance around the 2007-2008 financial crisis indicate that outside directors with financial experience acquired through longer board service at their own banks are more effective than those with financial experience acquired elsewhere. Institutions with more long-tenured independent directors (i) earn higher Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around the collapse of both Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, (ii) limit their risk exposure before the crisis, (iii) exhibit better stock return and accounting performance during the crisis, (iv) are less likely to be bailed out by the U.S. government's Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), and (v) receive proportionally less financial assis-tance from TARP. CO 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Details
- Title
- Are outside directors with greater board tenure valuable? Evidence from the last credit crisis q
- Creators
- Nuno Fernandes - IESE Business School, Camino del Cerro del Águila, 3, 28023 Madrid, SpainEliezer M. Fich - Drexel University
- Publication Details
- Journal of accounting and public policy, v 42(1)
- Publisher
- Elsevier
- Number of pages
- 18
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Finance
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:000963617300001
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-85142276197
- Other Identifier
- 991020542330004721
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- Collaboration types
- Domestic collaboration
- International collaboration
- Web of Science research areas
- Business, Finance
- Public Administration