Journal article
Asymmetric Information, Investment Banking Contracts and the Certification Hypothesis
Journal of banking & finance, v 17(1)
01 Feb 1993
Abstract
This study posits a hierarchy of investment banking contracts reflecting differential levels of certification. The analysis supporting the existence of this hierarchy is based on the reputational capital paradigm. The firm commitment-negotiated arrangement is perceived to have the highest quality of certification, followed by the firm commitment-competitive, best efforts-negotiated and best efforts-competitive arrangements in that order. The existence of this hierarchy is investigated by measuring market reactions to the announcements of such issues. The empirical results reveal sharp distinctions between firm commitment and best efforts contracts. However, within firm commitment contracts, signaling between negotiated and competitive arrangements is attenuated and the distinction is weak.
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Details
- Title
- Asymmetric Information, Investment Banking Contracts and the Certification Hypothesis
- Creators
- P Kumar - American UniversityGeorge Tsetsekos - Drexel University
- Publication Details
- Journal of banking & finance, v 17(1)
- Publisher
- Elsevier
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Finance
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:A1993KP98800008
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-43949173885
- Other Identifier
- 991019174305004721
InCites Highlights
Data related to this publication, from InCites Benchmarking & Analytics tool:
- Collaboration types
- Domestic collaboration
- Web of Science research areas
- Business, Finance
- Economics