Journal article
Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment
The Journal of political economy, v 105(1), pp 101-131
01 Feb 1997
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Abstract
In this paper, I structurally estimate a stochastic bargaining model of government formation in a multiparty parliamentary democracy, and I conduct policy experiments to evaluate the effects of changes in the bargaining procedure. I show that the model fits well data on the duration of negotiations and government durations in postwar Italy. Also, I show that changes in the proposer selection process would not affect either the duration of negotiations or government durations, whereas the imposition of a strict deadline would in general reduce the incentives to delay agreement as well as government durations.
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Details
- Title
- Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment
- Creators
- Antonio Merlo
- Publication Details
- The Journal of political economy, v 105(1), pp 101-131
- Publisher
- The University of Chicago Press
- Number of pages
- 31
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:A1997WH20100005
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-0000578284
- Other Identifier
- 991022026962404721
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- Web of Science research areas
- Economics