Journal article
Boards, Executive Excess Compensation, and Shared Power: Evidence from Nonprofit Firms
The Financial review (Buffalo, N.Y.), v 48(4), pp 617-643
01 Nov 2013
Abstract
We investigate how executives, the board, and excess compensation jointly affect the performance of nonprofits. Since the common measure of nonprofit performance often includes salaries, we also use expenses that directly benefit the targeted population. Our results suggest that above average compensation for executives is associated with poor firm performance. However, the negative relation of CEO pay to performance occurs for firms with only one executive, the CEO. We conclude that a powerful CEO with autonomy can harm firm performance, but other executives can mitigate these agency problems. The board also appears to monitor direct community benefits more than indirect benefits.
Metrics
Details
- Title
- Boards, Executive Excess Compensation, and Shared Power: Evidence from Nonprofit Firms
- Creators
- Jacqueline Garner - Mississippi State UniversityTeresa Harrison - Drexel University
- Publication Details
- The Financial review (Buffalo, N.Y.), v 48(4), pp 617-643
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Number of pages
- 27
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Economics (School of Economics)
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:000210727500004
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-84885460933
- Other Identifier
- 991019167613704721
InCites Highlights
Data related to this publication, from InCites Benchmarking & Analytics tool:
- Collaboration types
- Domestic collaboration
- Web of Science research areas
- Business, Finance