Journal article
Coalition governments and comparative constitutional design
European economic review, v 46(4), pp 893-907
01 Apr 2002
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Abstract
In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi-party parliamentary democracies. The approach is based on the estimation of a stochastic bargaining model which we use to investigate the effects of specific institutional features of parliamentary democracy on the formation and dissolution of coalition governments. We illustrate our methodology by presenting the results of two (counterfactual) experiments of comparative constitutional design.
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Details
- Title
- Coalition governments and comparative constitutional design
- Creators
- Daniel Diermeier - Northwestern UniversityHülya Eraslan - University of PennsylvaniaAntonio Merlo - University of Pennsylvania
- Publication Details
- European economic review, v 46(4), pp 893-907
- Publisher
- Elsevier
- Number of pages
- 15
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:000175613000019
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-0036266895
- Other Identifier
- 991022026960104721
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- Collaboration types
- Domestic collaboration
- International collaboration
- Web of Science research areas
- Economics