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Journal article
Concentration of control rights in leveraged loan syndicates
Journal of financial economics, v 137(1), pp 249-271
Jul 2020
Abstract
We find that corporate loan contracts frequently concentrate control rights with a subset of lenders. Despite the rise in term loans without financial covenants—so-called covenant-lite loans—borrowing firms’ revolving lines of credit almost always retain traditional financial covenants. This split structure gives revolving lenders the exclusive right and ability to monitor and to renegotiate the financial covenants, and we confirm that loans with split control rights are still subject to the discipline of financial covenants. We provide evidence that split control rights are designed to mitigate bargaining frictions that have arisen with the entry of nonbank lenders and became apparent during the financial crisis.
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Details
- Title
- Concentration of control rights in leveraged loan syndicates
- Creators
- Mitchell Berlin - Federal Reserve Bank of PhiladelphiaGreg Nini - Drexel UniversityEdison G. Yu - Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
- Publication Details
- Journal of financial economics, v 137(1), pp 249-271
- Publisher
- Elsevier
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Finance
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:000534399000011
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-85080101735
- Other Identifier
- 991019170973004721
InCites Highlights
Data related to this publication, from InCites Benchmarking & Analytics tool:
- Collaboration types
- Domestic collaboration
- Web of Science research areas
- Business, Finance
- Economics