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Accepted (AM)Open Access (License Unspecified), Open
Journal article
Corporate Pension Plans as Takeover Deterrents
Journal of financial and quantitative analysis, v 48(4), pp 1119-1144
01 Aug 2013
Abstract
We use UK data to show that firms that sponsor a defined-benefit pension plan are less likely to be targeted in an acquisition and, conditional on an attempted takeover, they are less likely to be acquired. Our explanation is that the uncertainty in the value of pension liabilities is a source of risk for acquirers of the firm's shares, which works as a takeover deterrent. In support of this explanation we find that these same firms are more likely to use cash when acquiring other firms, and that the announcement of a cash acquisition is associated with positive announcement effects.
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Details
- Title
- Corporate Pension Plans as Takeover Deterrents
- Creators
- João F. Cocco - London Business SchoolPaolo F. Volpin - London Business School
- Publication Details
- Journal of financial and quantitative analysis, v 48(4), pp 1119-1144
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Number of pages
- 26
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Finance
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:000330462700005
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-84891544329
- Other Identifier
- 991021861823004721
InCites Highlights
Data related to this publication, from InCites Benchmarking & Analytics tool:
- Web of Science research areas
- Business, Finance
- Economics