Journal article
Corporate governance and shareholder initiatives: Empirical evidence
Journal of financial economics, v 42(3), pp 365-395
01 Nov 1996
Abstract
Shareholder-initiated proxy proposals on corporate governance issues became popular in the late 1980s as corporate takeover activity declined. We find firms attracting governance proposals have poor prior performance, as measured by the market-to-book ratio, operating return, and sales growth. There is little evidence that operating returns improve after proposals. The proposals also have negligible effects on company share values and top management turnover. Even proposals that receive a majority of shareholder votes typically do not engender share price increases or discernible changes in firm policies.
Metrics
Details
- Title
- Corporate governance and shareholder initiatives: Empirical evidence
- Creators
- Jonathan M. Karpoff - University of WashingtonPaul H. Malatesta - University of WashingtonRalph A. Walkling - The Ohio State University
- Publication Details
- Journal of financial economics, v 42(3), pp 365-395
- Publisher
- Elsevier
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Finance
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:A1996VR39300004
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-0030295681
- Other Identifier
- 991021881497404721
InCites Highlights
Data related to this publication, from InCites Benchmarking & Analytics tool:
- Collaboration types
- Domestic collaboration
- Web of Science research areas
- Business, Finance
- Economics