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Accepted (AM)Open Access (License Unspecified), Open
Journal article
Disciplinary directors: Evidence from the appointments of outside directors who have fired CEOs
Journal of banking & finance, v 96, pp 221-235
01 Nov 2018
Abstract
By examining board appointments of outside directors who have previously fired a CEO, we study how directors’ willingness to take disciplinary actions is related to a firm's performance and risk-taking. Such directors (‘disciplinary directors’) appear to benefit firms with weak monitoring, but hurt firms in innovative industries. Firms appointing a disciplinary director subsequently exhibit lower idiosyncratic risk, leverage, and R&D expense, make fewer acquisitions, and are more likely to replace poorly performing CEOs. Overall, disciplinary directors appear to influence managerial behavior and shareholder wealth.
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Details
- Title
- Disciplinary directors: Evidence from the appointments of outside directors who have fired CEOs
- Creators
- Jay Cai - Drexel UniversityTu Nguyen - University of Waterloo
- Publication Details
- Journal of banking & finance, v 96, pp 221-235
- Publisher
- Elsevier
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Finance
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:000450020200014
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-85053833013
- Other Identifier
- 991020534937204721
InCites Highlights
Data related to this publication, from InCites Benchmarking & Analytics tool:
- Collaboration types
- Domestic collaboration
- International collaboration
- Web of Science research areas
- Business, Finance
- Economics