Journal article
Economic planning for market economies: The optimality of planning in an economy with uncertainty and asymmetrical information
Economic modelling, v 2(4), pp 317-323
01 Oct 1985
Featured in Collection : UN Sustainable Development Goals @ Drexel
Abstract
The paper is based on a disequilibrium model which is Keynesian in the ‘short run’, ie with given expectations, but which admits of a continuum of equilibria when expectations are rational. Expectations are adaptive (so that they are rational only in the long run) but can be influenced by an indicative plan. The government and the private sector have differing information sets, each knowing some things the other sector does not (spontaneously) know. It is shown that in this world, an optimal plan dominates a self-fulfilling plan, which in turn dominates a no-planning equilibrium.
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Details
- Title
- Economic planning for market economies: The optimality of planning in an economy with uncertainty and asymmetrical information
- Creators
- Roger A. McCain - Brooklyn College
- Publication Details
- Economic modelling, v 2(4), pp 317-323
- Publisher
- Elsevier
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Economics (School of Economics)
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:A1985A143800003
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-46549098138
- Other Identifier
- 991021807001704721
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- Web of Science research areas
- Economics