Journal article
Efficient Delays in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining
Economic theory, v 11(1), pp 39-55
01 Jan 1998
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Abstract
We consider a k-player sequential bargaining model in which both the cake size and the identity of the proposer are determined by a stochastic process. For the case where the cake is a simplex (of random size) and the players share a common discount factor, we establish the existence of a unique stationary subgame perfect payoff which is efficient and characterize the conditions under which agreement is delayed. We also investigate how the equilibrium payoffs depend on the order in which the players move and on the correlation between the identity of the proposer and the cake size.
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Details
- Title
- Efficient Delays in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining
- Creators
- Antonio Merlo - University of MinnesotaCharles Wilson - New York University
- Publication Details
- Economic theory, v 11(1), pp 39-55
- Publisher
- Springer-Verlag
- Number of pages
- 17
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:A1998YJ00500002
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-0032221350
- Other Identifier
- 991022026959904721
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- Collaboration types
- Domestic collaboration
- Web of Science research areas
- Economics