Journal article
Electing Directors
The Journal of finance (New York), v 64(5), pp 2389-2421
01 Oct 2009
Abstract
Using a large sample of director elections, we document that shareholder votes are significantly related to firm performance, governance, director performance, and voting mechanisms. However, most variables, except meeting attendance and ISS recommendations, have little economic impact on shareholder votes-even poorly performing directors and firms typically receive over 90% of votes cast. Nevertheless, fewer votes lead to lower "abnormal" CEO compensation and a higher probability of removing poison pills, classified boards, and CEOs. Meanwhile, director votes have little impact on election outcomes, firm performance, or director reputation. These results provide important benchmarks for the current debate on election reforms.
Metrics
Details
- Title
- Electing Directors
- Creators
- Jie Cai - Drexel UniversityJacqueline L. Garner - Drexel Univ, LeBow Coll Business, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USARalph A. Walkling - Drexel University
- Publication Details
- The Journal of finance (New York), v 64(5), pp 2389-2421
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Number of pages
- 33
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Finance
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:000270236200013
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-70349458959
- Other Identifier
- 991019168522904721
InCites Highlights
Data related to this publication, from InCites Benchmarking & Analytics tool:
- Web of Science research areas
- Business, Finance
- Economics