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Journal article
Equilibrium selection in aggregative games with strategic complementarities
Journal of mathematical economics, v 122, 103195
Feb 2026
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Abstract
We study large games played by heterogeneous agents whose payoffs depend on their type and on the aggregate action. We show that when player actions and the aggregate action are complements the global games equilibrium selection yields a unique equilibrium. We characterize the selected equilibrium as the strategy profile that maximizes average expected payoffs when players have pessimistic beliefs about the aggregate action. In particular, each agent believes to be the lowest type to contribute to the aggregate action. To obtain our result we prove that beliefs about the distribution of the aggregate action in the global game satisfy a generalized Laplacian property, which states that the (weighted) average belief is the uniform distribution.
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Details
- Title
- Equilibrium selection in aggregative games with strategic complementarities
- Creators
- Ricardo Serrano-Padial (Corresponding Author) - Drexel University
- Publication Details
- Journal of mathematical economics, v 122, 103195
- Publisher
- Elsevier
- Number of pages
- 14
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Economics (School of Economics)
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:001620502200001
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-105021655695
- Other Identifier
- 991022133531804721
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- Web of Science research areas
- Economics
- Mathematics, Interdisciplinary Applications
- Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods