Journal article
Evidence of Selling by Managers after Seasoned Equity Offering Announcements
Financial management, v 26(3), pp 37-53
01 Oct 1997
Abstract
This paper documents concentrated net selling by managers in the month immediately following the announcement of seasoned equity offerings, together with continued substantial net selling for several additional months. This suggests that insiders may delay a significant amount of trading to avoid legal and market penalties. Significant abnormal insider net selling is evident both before and after passage of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984. We also find more post-announcement abnormal insider selling for growth firms than for mature firms, which is consistent with a greater degree of overpricing for growth firms than mature firms.
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Details
- Title
- Evidence of Selling by Managers after Seasoned Equity Offering Announcements
- Creators
- Michael GombolaHei Lee - Business - Accounting and FinanceFeng-Ying Liu
- Publication Details
- Financial management, v 26(3), pp 37-53
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- [Retired Faculty]
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:A1997YA23300003
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-0040651677
- Other Identifier
- 991019169399404721
InCites Highlights
Data related to this publication, from InCites Benchmarking & Analytics tool:
- Collaboration types
- Domestic collaboration
- Web of Science research areas
- Business, Finance