Journal article
Governance with poor investor protection: evidence from top executive turnover in Italy
Journal of financial economics, v 64(1), pp 61-90
01 Apr 2002
Abstract
This paper studies the determinants of executive turnover and firm valuation as a function of ownership and control structure in Italy, a country that features low legal protection for investors, firms with controlling shareholders, and pyramidal groups. The results suggest that there is poor governance, as measured by a low sensitivity of turnover to performance and a low Q ratio, when (i) the controlling shareholders are also top executives, (ii) the control is fully in the hands of one shareholder and is not shared by a set of core shareholders, and (iii) the controlling shareholders own less than 50% of the firm's cash-flow rights.
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Details
- Title
- Governance with poor investor protection: evidence from top executive turnover in Italy
- Creators
- Paolo F. Volpin - London Business School
- Publication Details
- Journal of financial economics, v 64(1), pp 61-90
- Publisher
- Elsevier
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Finance
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:000175598900003
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-0036234941
- Other Identifier
- 991021861636304721
InCites Highlights
Data related to this publication, from InCites Benchmarking & Analytics tool:
- Web of Science research areas
- Business, Finance
- Economics