Journal article
Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies
Journal of economic theory, v 94(1), pp 46-79
01 Sep 2000
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Abstract
In this paper we consider a dynamic model of government formation in parliamentary democracies that accounts for the following phenomena: (1) minority and surplus governments; (2) cabinet reshuffles; (3) cabinet terminations due to replacement or early elections; (4) the relative instability of minority governments. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D72, H19, C73.
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Details
- Title
- Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies
- Creators
- Daniel Diermeier - Northwestern UniversityAntonio Merlo - University of Pennsylvania
- Publication Details
- Journal of economic theory, v 94(1), pp 46-79
- Publisher
- Elsevier
- Number of pages
- 34
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:000089823200003
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-0001871710
- Other Identifier
- 991022026858504721
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- Collaboration types
- Domestic collaboration
- Web of Science research areas
- Economics