Journal article
Incentive Compensation for Bank Directors: The Impact of Deregulation
The Journal of business (Chicago, Ill.), v 78(5), pp 1753-1778
01 Sep 2005
Abstract
Although deregulation leads to changes in the duties of boards of directors, little is known about changes in their incentives. U.S. banking deregulation and associated changes during the 1990s lends itself to a natural experiment. These industry shocks forced bank directors to face expanded opportunities, increased competition, and an expanding market for corporate control. While bank directors received significantly less equity-based compensation throughout most of the 1990s, by 1999, their use of such compensation is indistinguishable from a matched sample of industrial firms. Our results suggest firms respond to deregulation by improving internal monitoring through aligning directors' and shareholders' incentives. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
Metrics
Details
- Title
- Incentive Compensation for Bank Directors: The Impact of Deregulation
- Creators
- David BecherTerry Campbell - University of DelawareMelissa Frye
- Publication Details
- The Journal of business (Chicago, Ill.), v 78(5), pp 1753-1778
- Publisher
- University of Chicago, acting through its Press
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Finance
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:000232977700005
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-32144457431
- Other Identifier
- 991019169703004721
InCites Highlights
Data related to this publication, from InCites Benchmarking & Analytics tool:
- Collaboration types
- Domestic collaboration
- Web of Science research areas
- Business