Incentive Effects of Stock and Option Holdings of Target and Acquirer CEOs

Title: Incentive Effects of Stock and Option Holdings of Target and Acquirer CEOs
Creators: JIE Cai
ANAND M. Vijh - Correspondence address: Cai is from the LeBow College of Business at Drexel University and Vijh is from the Tippie College of Business at the University of Iowa. We have benefited from presentations at the University of Iowa, Drexel University, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation meetings, the Financial Management Association meetings, Fordham University, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Iowa State University, Suffolk University, the University of Central Florida, the University of Kentucky, the University of Nebraska, and Wilfrid Laurier University. We wish to thank Matt Billett, Ben Esty, Jon Garfinkel, Todd Houge, and Erik Lie for useful comments. We are especially obliged to an anonymous referee, an associate editor, and Rob Stambaugh (the editor) for many insightful comments that substantially improved this paper. All errors and omissions are our own responsibility
Publication Details: The Journal of finance (New York), v 62(4), pp 1891-1933
Publisher: Blackwell Publishing Inc
Number of pages: 43
Resource Type: Journal article
Language: English
Academic Unit: Finance
Web of Science ID: WOS:000248726300011
Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-34547912557
Other Identifier: 991019168353604721

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