Journal article
Incentivizing Financial Regulators
The Review of financial studies, v 34(10), pp 4745-4784
01 Oct 2021
Abstract
I study how promotion incentives within the public sector affect financial regulation. I assemble individual data for all SEC enforcement attorneys between 2002 and 2017, including enforcement cases, salaries, and ranks. Consistent with tournament model, attorneys with stronger promotion incentives are involved in more enforcement, especially against severe misconduct, and in tougher settlement terms. For identification, I rely on cross-sectional tests within offices and ranks and on exogenous variation in salaries resulting from a conversion to a new pay system. The findings highlight a novel link between incentives and regulation and show that the regulator's organizational design affects securities markets.
Metrics
Details
- Title
- Incentivizing Financial Regulators
- Creators
- Joseph Kalmenovitz - Lebow College of Business Drexel University
- Publication Details
- The Review of financial studies, v 34(10), pp 4745-4784
- Publisher
- Oxford Univ Press
- Number of pages
- 40
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Finance
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:000701512100005
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-85116382729
- Other Identifier
- 991019167446004721
InCites Highlights
Data related to this publication, from InCites Benchmarking & Analytics tool:
- Web of Science research areas
- Business, Finance
- Economics