Journal article
Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining
Journal of economic theory, v 103(1), pp 31-48
01 Mar 2002
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Abstract
In this paper we consider multilateral stochastic bargaining models with general agreement rules. For n-player games where in each period a player is randomly selected to allocate a stochastic level of surplus and q⩽n players have to agree on a proposal to induce its acceptance, we characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs and establish their existence. We show that for agreement rules other than the unanimity rule, the equilibrium payoffs need not be unique. Furthermore, even when the equilibrium is unique, it need not be efficient. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73, C78, D70.
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Details
- Title
- Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining
- Creators
- Hülya Eraslan - University of PennsylvaniaAntonio Merlo - University of Pennsylvania
- Publication Details
- Journal of economic theory, v 103(1), pp 31-48
- Publisher
- Elsevier
- Number of pages
- 18
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:000174465700003
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-0036206531
- Other Identifier
- 991022026857404721
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- Web of Science research areas
- Economics