Journal article
Managerial Decisions, Internal Organization Structure, And Agency Considerations
Journal of applied business research, v 4(4), p66
26 Oct 2011
Abstract
This paper deals with issues related to productive inefficiencies that occur at a divisional level of a multinational firm. More specifically, the paper introduces an additional consideration in the agency relationship, namely, the internal organization structure. It is argued that the internal organization structure imposes restrictions on the behavior of divisional managers resulting in financial decisions characterized by short-term orientation and risk aversion. These suboptimal financial decisions generate organizational costs, called managerial regulatory costs, which should be distinguished from agency-type costs.
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Details
- Title
- Managerial Decisions, Internal Organization Structure, And Agency Considerations
- Creators
- George Tsetsekos - Drexel University
- Publication Details
- Journal of applied business research, v 4(4), p66
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Finance
- Other Identifier
- 991021881407904721