Journal article
Mediocracy
Journal of public economics, v 130, pp 32-44
01 Oct 2015
Featured in Collection : UN Sustainable Development Goals @ Drexel
Abstract
We study the recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by two political parties competing in an election. We show that political parties may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that they could select better individuals. Furthermore, we show that when political talent is scarce this phenomenon is more likely to occur in proportional than in majoritarian electoral systems. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Details
- Title
- Mediocracy
- Creators
- Andrea Mattozzi - European University InstituteAntonio Merlo - Rice University
- Publication Details
- Journal of public economics, v 130, pp 32-44
- Publisher
- Elsevier
- Number of pages
- 13
- Grant note
- Government of Catalonia; Generalitat de Catalunya SES-0617892; SES-0617901 / National Science Foundation; National Science Foundation (NSF) Barcelona GSE
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:000365061300003
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-84940785644
- Other Identifier
- 991022026857304721
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- Collaboration types
- Domestic collaboration
- International collaboration
- Web of Science research areas
- Economics