Business & Economics Management Operations Research & Management Science Science & Technology Social Sciences Technology
A central goal in the long literature on fair division is the design of mechanisms that implement fair outcomes, despite the participants' strategic behavior. We study this question by measuring the fairness of an allocation using the geometric mean of the agents' values, known as the Nash social welfare (NSW). This objective is maximized by widely known concepts such as the Nash bargaining solution, proportional fairness, and the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes; we focus on (approximately) implementing this objective and analyze the Trading Post mechanism. We consider allocating goods that are substitutes or complements and show that this mechanism achieves an approximation of two for concave utility functions and becomes essentially optimal for complements, where it can reach (1 + epsilon) for any (epsilon > 0). Moreover, we show that the Nash equilibria of this mechanism are pure and provide individual fairness in the sense of proportionality.
Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents
Creators
Simina Bra - Purdue Univ, Comp Sci, W Lafayette, IN 47407 USA
Vasilis Gkatzelis - Drexel University
Ruta Mehta - University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
Publication Details
Operations research, v 70(1), pp 402-415
Publisher
Informs
Number of pages
15
Grant note
2014389 / United States-Israel Binational Science Foundation; US-Israel Binational Science Foundation
1408635; 1216073; 1161813 / Division of Computing and Communication Foundations; National Science Foundation (NSF); NSF - Directorate for Computer & Information Science & Engineering (CISE)
740282 / European Research Council under the European Union; European Research Council (ERC)
1435/14 / Israel Science Foundation
CCF-175595; CCF-1750436 / National Science Foundation; National Science Foundation (NSF)
Resource Type
Journal article
Language
English
Academic Unit
Computer Science
Web of Science ID
WOS:000709015000001
Scopus ID
2-s2.0-85125008964
Other Identifier
991019302292104721
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