Logo image
Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents
Journal article   Open access   Peer reviewed

Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents

Simina Bra, Vasilis Gkatzelis and Ruta Mehta
Operations research, v 70(1), pp 402-415
01 Jan 2022
url
https://arxiv.org/abs/1607.01569View

Abstract

Business & Economics Management Operations Research & Management Science Science & Technology Social Sciences Technology
A central goal in the long literature on fair division is the design of mechanisms that implement fair outcomes, despite the participants' strategic behavior. We study this question by measuring the fairness of an allocation using the geometric mean of the agents' values, known as the Nash social welfare (NSW). This objective is maximized by widely known concepts such as the Nash bargaining solution, proportional fairness, and the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes; we focus on (approximately) implementing this objective and analyze the Trading Post mechanism. We consider allocating goods that are substitutes or complements and show that this mechanism achieves an approximation of two for concave utility functions and becomes essentially optimal for complements, where it can reach (1 + epsilon) for any (epsilon > 0). Moreover, we show that the Nash equilibria of this mechanism are pure and provide individual fairness in the sense of proportionality.

Metrics

11 Record Views
16 citations in Scopus

Details

InCites Highlights

Data related to this publication, from InCites Benchmarking & Analytics tool:

Collaboration types
Domestic collaboration
Web of Science research areas
Management
Operations Research & Management Science
Logo image