In this paper, we investigate a supply chain involving one risk-neutral supplier and one risk-averse retailer, where the retailer adopts the conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) criterion as his performance measure. To hedge against high risk, the retailer purchases call options from the supplier to adjust his firm orders. We derive the optimal order and production policies, with and without a call option contract and demonstrate that the call option contract can benefit both the retailer and the supplier. In addition, we also generate insights regarding how the contract parameters, level of risk aversion and shortage cost impact the retailer's optimal policy, highlighting the importance of considering the risk aversion and shortage cost simultaneously. Finally, we derive the condition for the supply chain to be coordinated and show that compared to non-coordinating contracts, the wholesale price and call option portfolio contracts proposed in this paper can achieve Pareto optimality. Numerical experiments are conducted to demonstrate theoretical results and observations.
Optimal Decisions of a Supply Chain With a Risk-Averse Retailer and Portfolio Contracts
Creators
Han Zhao - Tsinghua University
Shiji Song - Tsinghua University
Yuli Zhang - Beijing Institute of Technology
Jatinder N. D Gupta - Beijing Institute of Technology
Anna G Devlin - University of Alabama in Huntsville
Publication Details
IEEE access, v 7, pp 123877-123892
Publisher
IEEE
Grant note
Beijing Institute of Technology (10.13039/501100005085)
2018607202007 / DongGuan Innovative Research Team Program
17BGL140 / National Social Science Fund of China
U1660202; 71871023; 61503211 / National Natural Science Foundation of China (10.13039/501100001809)
Resource Type
Journal article
Language
English
Academic Unit
Decision Sciences (and Management Information Systems)
Web of Science ID
WOS:000487836500007
Scopus ID
2-s2.0-85078339654
Other Identifier
991019168367204721
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