Files and links (1)
SubmittedCC BY-NC V4.0, Open
Journal article
Pattern Bargaining
International economic review (Philadelphia), v 45(1), pp 239-255
Feb 2004
Featured in Collection : UN Sustainable Development Goals @ Drexel
Abstract
Many unions in the United States have for several years engaged in what is known as pattern bargaining. In this article, we show that pattern bargaining is preferred by a union to both simultaneous industry-wide negotiations and sequential negotiations without a pattern. Allowing for interfirm productivity differentials within an industry, we show that for small differentials, the union most prefers a pattern in wages, but for a sufficiently wide differential, the union prefers a pattern in labor costs. Finally, we demonstrate that pattern bargaining can be a significant entry deterrent. This provides an explanation for why incumbent firms in an industry may support the use of pattern bargaining in labor negotiations.
Metrics
Details
- Title
- Pattern Bargaining
- Creators
- Robert C. Marshall - University of PennsylvaniaAntonio Merlo
- Publication Details
- International economic review (Philadelphia), v 45(1), pp 239-255
- Publisher
- Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association
- Number of pages
- 17
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:000188544800010
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-1642445346
- Other Identifier
- 991022026962304721
UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
This publication has contributed to the advancement of the following goals:
InCites Highlights
Data related to this publication, from InCites Benchmarking & Analytics tool:
- Collaboration types
- Domestic collaboration
- Web of Science research areas
- Economics