Journal article
Philosophical success
Philosophical studies, v 172(8), pp 2109-2121
2015
Abstract
Peter van Inwagen proposes a criterion of philosophical success. He takes it to support an extremely pessimistic view about philosophy. He thinks that all philosophical arguments for substantive conclusions fail, including the argument from evil. I’m more optimistic on both counts. I’ll identify problems with van Inwagen’s criterion and propose an alternative. I’ll then explore the differing implications of our criteria. On my view, philosophical arguments can succeed and the argument from evil isn’t obviously a failure.
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Details
- Title
- Philosophical success
- Creators
- Nathan Hanna - Drexel University
- Publication Details
- Philosophical studies, v 172(8), pp 2109-2121
- Publisher
- Springer Netherlands
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- English and Philosophy
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:000357051200009
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-84934444288
- Other Identifier
- 991019167865604721
InCites Highlights
Data related to this publication, from InCites Benchmarking & Analytics tool:
- Web of Science research areas
- Philosophy