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Problems of commitment in arming and war: how insecurity and destruction matter
Journal article   Open access   Peer reviewed

Problems of commitment in arming and war: how insecurity and destruction matter

Michelle R. Garfinkel and Constantinos Syropoulos
Public choice, v 178(3-4), pp 349-369
01 Mar 2019
url
https://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0wc7m6bqView

Abstract

Business & Economics Economics Government & Law Political Science Social Sciences
This paper analyzes a guns-versus-butter model in which two agents compete for control over an insecure portion of their combined output. They can resolve this dispute either peacefully through settlement or by military force through open conflict (war). Both types of conflict resolution depend on the agents' arming choices, but only war is destructive. We find that, insofar as entering into binding contracts on arms is not possible and agents must arm even under settlement to secure a bigger share of the contested output, the absence of long-term commitments need not be essential in understanding the outbreak of destructive war. Instead, the ability to make short-term commitments could induce war. More generally, our analysis highlights how the pattern of war's destructive effects, the degree of output insecurity and the initial distribution of resources matter for arming decisions and the choice between peace and war. We also explore the implications of transfers for peace.

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7 citations in Scopus

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#16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions

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Collaboration types
Domestic collaboration
Web of Science research areas
Economics
Political Science
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