Retributivism revisited

Nathan Hanna

doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0103-0

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Journal article

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Peer reviewed

Retributivism revisited

Nathan Hanna

Philosophical studies, v 167(2), pp 473-484

2014

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0103-0

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Abstract

Article

Education

Epistemology

Ethics

General

Metaphysics

Philosophy

Philosophy of Language

Philosophy of Mind

I’ll raise a problem for Retributivism, the view that legal punishment is justified on the basis of desert. I’ll focus primarily on Mitchell Berman’s recent defense of the view. He gives one of the most sophisticated and careful statements of it. And his argument is representative, so the problem I’ll raise for it will apply to other versions of Retributivism. His insights about justification also help to make the problem particularly obvious. I’ll also show how the problem extends to non-retributive justifications of punishment. I’ll argue that Berman’s argument makes a questionable assumption about the standard of justification that justifications of punishment must meet to be successful. If we think about what it takes to justify punishment and reflect on the intuitions that retributivists appeal to, it turns out that the intuitions aren’t obviously up to the task.