Journal article
Risk sharing vs. incentives: Contract design under two-sided heterogeneity
Economics letters, v 88(3), pp 343-349
2005
Abstract
We study the matching patterns between heterogeneous principals and agents in a principal agent model. The resulting equilibrium relationship between risk and incentives could be negative, positive or U-shaped. These results may provide an explanation for the absence of systematic empirical support for the standard risk model.
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Details
- Title
- Risk sharing vs. incentives: Contract design under two-sided heterogeneity
- Creators
- Konstantinos Serfes - Drexel University
- Publication Details
- Economics letters, v 88(3), pp 343-349
- Publisher
- Elsevier
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Economics (School of Economics)
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:000231199000009
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-22144492203
- Other Identifier
- 991019169617304721
InCites Highlights
Data related to this publication, from InCites Benchmarking & Analytics tool:
- Web of Science research areas
- Economics