Files and links (1)
Published, Version of Record (VoR)Open Access (License Unspecified), Open
Journal article
Rules for Dividing a Disputed Resource in the Context of the Classical Liberal Argument for Peace
Peace economics, peace science, and public policy, v 24(1), pp 1-16
09 Feb 2018
Featured in Collection : UN Sustainable Development Goals @ Drexel
Abstract
In this paper, we study alternative forms of conflict resolution, both peaceful
and non-peaceful, between two countries that compete for claims to a resource
used to produce potentially traded goods. Consistent with the classical liberal
argument, peace supports mutually beneficial trade, whereas war preempts it. War
always induces countries to allocate resources into non-contractible arming
(“guns”) for superiority in conflict. Under peaceful settlement,
countries might choose to arm as well for gaining leverage in negotiations, but
arming is typically less than what it is under war. Building on the observation
that arming itself affects the countries’ bargaining sets, we compare the
efficiency properties of division rules generated by three prominent bargaining
solutions – namely, splitting the surplus, equal sacrifice, and Nash
bargaining – and show how they depend on the gains from trade.
Metrics
Details
- Title
- Rules for Dividing a Disputed Resource in the Context of the Classical Liberal Argument for Peace
- Creators
- Michelle R Garfinkel - Department of Economics, University of California, Irvine, 92697-5100, USAConstantinos Syropoulos - School of Economics, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
- Publication Details
- Peace economics, peace science, and public policy, v 24(1), pp 1-16
- Publisher
- De Gruyter
- Number of pages
- 16
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Economics (School of Economics)
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:000424995900002
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-85042060596
- Other Identifier
- 991014877797304721
UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
This publication has contributed to the advancement of the following goals:
InCites Highlights
Data related to this publication, from InCites Benchmarking & Analytics tool:
- Collaboration types
- Domestic collaboration
- Web of Science research areas
- Political Science