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Self-enforcing peace agreements that preserve the status quo
Journal article   Open access   Peer reviewed

Self-enforcing peace agreements that preserve the status quo

Michelle R. Garfinkel and Constantinos Syropoulos
Games and economic behavior, v 130, pp 148-178
Nov 2021
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.07.012
Featured in Collection :   UN Sustainable Development Goals @ Drexel
url
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.07.012View
Published, Version of Record (VoR)CC BY-NC-ND V4.0,  Open

Abstract

Destructive wars Disputes Output insecurity Peaceful settlement Unarmed peace
On the basis of a single-period, guns-versus-butter, complete-information model in which two agents dispute control over an insecure portion of their combined output, we study the choice between a peace agreement that maintains the status quo without arming (or unarmed peace) and open conflict (or war) that is possibly destructive. With a focus on outcomes that are immune to both unilateral deviations and coalitional deviations, we find that, depending on war's destructive effects, the degree of output security and the initial distribution of resources, peace can, but need not necessarily, emerge in equilibrium. We also find that, ex ante resource transfers without commitments can improve the prospects for peace, but only when the configuration of parameters describing the degree of output security and the degree of war's destruction ensures the possibility of peace without such transfers at least for some sufficiently even initial resource distributions.

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3 citations in Web of Science
4 citations in Scopus

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UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

This publication has contributed to the advancement of the following goals:

#16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions

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Domestic collaboration
Web of Science research areas
Economics
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