Journal article
Shareholder Access to the Boardroom: A Survey of Recent Evidence
Journal of applied finance : JAF, Vol.20(2), pp.15-26
22 Sep 2010
Abstract
This article provides a summary of recent research regarding shareholder access to the boardroom. First, we examine director elections to document the current level of shareholder access. We then explore evidence surrounding majority voting. Third, we review shareholder nominations of directors. Fourth, we discuss Say-on-Pay. Fifth, we review the recent evidence on shareholder proposals. Six, we examine the impact of removing broker votes. Finally, we conclude that most shareholders currently have very limited access to the boardroom. In most director elections, whoever is nominated by the current board faces little opposition to being elected. Nevertheless, some empirical evidence we survey suggests that more shareholder access, like more regulation, is not necessarily better. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
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Details
- Title
- Shareholder Access to the Boardroom: A Survey of Recent Evidence
- Creators
- Jay CaiJacqueline GarnerRalph Walkling
- Publication Details
- Journal of applied finance : JAF, Vol.20(2), pp.15-26
- Publisher
- Financial Management Association International
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Finance
- Identifiers
- 991020534927504721