Journal article
Symmetry in Pay for Luck
The Review of financial studies, v 33(7), pp 3174-3204
01 Jul 2020
Abstract
In this study, we take a comprehensive look at asymmetry in pay for luck, which is the finding that CEOs are rewarded for good luck, but are not penalized to the same extent for bad luck. Our main takeaway, which is based on over 200 different specifications, is that there is no asymmetry in pay for luck. Our finding is important given that the literature widely accepts the idea of asymmetry in pay for luck and typically points to this as evidence of rent extraction.
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Details
- Title
- Symmetry in Pay for Luck
- Creators
- Naveen D. Daniel - Drexel UniversityYuanzhi Li - Temple UniversityLalitha Naveen - Temple University
- Publication Details
- The Review of financial studies, v 33(7), pp 3174-3204
- Publisher
- Oxford Univ Press
- Number of pages
- 31
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Finance
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:000562481500008
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-85090687178
- Other Identifier
- 991019167773704721
InCites Highlights
Data related to this publication, from InCites Benchmarking & Analytics tool:
- Collaboration types
- Domestic collaboration
- Web of Science research areas
- Business, Finance
- Economics