Journal article
THE COST OF SUPERVISION AND THE QUALITY OF LABOR, A DETERMINANT OF X-INEFFICIENCY
RBER, review of business and economic research, Vol.8(3), pp.1-16
01 Apr 1973
Abstract
LABOR CONTRACTS ARE INCOMPLETE INTER ALIA IN THAT THEY DO NOT SPECIFY ALL OF THE DIMENSIONS OF THE LABOR INPUT OR, SPECIFYING THEM, DO NOT ASSURE THAT THEY WILL BE DELIVERED IN THE ABSENCE OF POLICING. THUS, INEFFICIENCY OCCURS TO THE EXTENT THAT POLICING IS NOT BOTH PERFECT AND FREE. THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG COSTS OF SUPERVISION, NON-TIME DIMENSIONS OF THE LABOR INPUT AND X-INEFFICIENCY ARE EXPLORED. A PARALLEL MODEL IS DEVELOPED OF LABOR QUALITY AND X-EFFICIENCY IN THE CASE OF SELF-EMPLOYED, AS WELL AS HIRED LABOR. INSOFAR AS X-INEFFICIENCY IS RELATED TO THE COST OF SUPERVISION, A SELF-EMPLOYED WORKER, WHOSE ACTIVITY HAS NO COST OF SUPERVISION, WOULD DISPLAY NO X-INEFFICIENCY EITHER. THUS SELF-EMPLOYMENT PROVIDES A CONVENIENT STANDARD OF PERFECT EFFICIENCY RATHER LIKE THAT OF PERFECT COMPETITION.
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Details
- Title
- THE COST OF SUPERVISION AND THE QUALITY OF LABOR, A DETERMINANT OF X-INEFFICIENCY
- Creators
- Roger McCain
- Publication Details
- RBER, review of business and economic research, Vol.8(3), pp.1-16
- Publisher
- University of New Orleans, Business and Economic Research
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Economics (School of Economics)
- Identifiers
- 991021807100704721