Journal article
THE DIFFERING CONCEPTIONS OF CULPABILITY IN LAW & PSYCHOLOGY
Widener Law Review, Vol.11, pp.83-309
01 Jan 2004
Abstract
I want to thank the Widener Law Review, the Institute for Graduate Clinical Psychology, and Professor Marcyzk, particularly, for giving me the honor of offering this afternoon's keynote address. Sometimes your students turn out well, and Professor Marcyzk is a striking example, but just one of many, testifying to the worth of joint programs in law and psychology. In the next 45 minutes or so I will address four topics related to the theme of this symposium. First, I will attempt to show how the differing conceptions of culpability in criminal law and psychology, that is, that behavior is either the result of free will or is determined, affects how society metes out punishment. I will follow that brief discussion with three examples of the clash between law and psychology within the context of the death penalty. Using Lockhart v. McCree, 1 I will show how the Supreme Court ignores sound social science data that has a direct impact on how the death penalty is adjudicated. Using Atkins v. Virginia 2 and to a lesser extent, the juvenile death penalty cases, I will show how organized psychology misuses social science data in applying the death penalty and that its view, ironically, diminishes rather than enhances the rights of vulnerable populations. And, finally, using a burgeoning favorite instrument of prosecutorial expert witnesses, I will show how psychologists misrepresent or are oblivious to relevant research in giving expert opinions about who is eligible for the death penalty ...
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Details
- Title
- THE DIFFERING CONCEPTIONS OF CULPABILITY IN LAW & PSYCHOLOGY
- Creators
- Donald N. Bersoff
- Publication Details
- Widener Law Review, Vol.11, pp.83-309
- Publisher
- Widener University School of Law Widener Law Review
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Thomas R. Kline School of Law
- Identifiers
- 991021874606404721