Journal article
The Impact of Managerial Ownership on Acquisition Attempts and Target Shareholder Wealth
Journal of financial and quantitative analysis, v 28(4), pp 439-457
01 Dec 1993
Abstract
This paper examines the relation between managerial ownership and the probability of being a target firm, and the impact of managerial ownership on target shareholder returns. The paper finds that targets have lower managerial ownership than either their industry counterparts or randomly selected nontargets. Managerial ownership is significantly lower in contested compared to uncontested offers, and in unsuccessful compared to successful cases. Managerial ownership is significantly related to abnormal returns in contested cases that are ultimately successful. The results are consistent with a positive impact of managerial ownership where it is used to negotiate, but not ultimately block, an acquisition.
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Details
- Title
- The Impact of Managerial Ownership on Acquisition Attempts and Target Shareholder Wealth
- Creators
- Moon H. SongRalph A. Walkling
- Publication Details
- Journal of financial and quantitative analysis, v 28(4), pp 439-457
- Publisher
- University of Washington Graduate School of Business Administration
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Finance
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:A1993MR03900001
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-84972065982
- Other Identifier
- 991021881391104721
InCites Highlights
Data related to this publication, from InCites Benchmarking & Analytics tool:
- Collaboration types
- Domestic collaboration
- Web of Science research areas
- Business, Finance
- Economics