Journal article
The Role of Upstream-Downstream Competition on Bundling Decisions: Should Regulators Force Firms to Unbundle ?
Journal of economics & management strategy, v 18(2), pp 547-588
01 Jun 2009
Featured in Collection : UN Sustainable Development Goals @ Drexel
Abstract
We develop an upstream-downstream model to analyze downstream firms' incentives to bundle. In our framework, the upstream firms are content providers (such as television stations) and the downstream firms are system operators (such as cable/satellite operators). We show that an a la carte regulation (i.e., a regulation that forces downstream firms to unbundle) leads to higher consumer surplus, if the unregulated equilibrium exhibits pure bundling (PB). Hence, our model predicts that in the television industry, which is mainly characterized by PB, an a la carte regulation will be beneficial for the consumers. If, on the other hand, the unregulated equilibrium is characterized by mixed bundling, then an a la carte regulation will increase consumer welfare provided that demand for multiple purchases is strong.
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Details
- Title
- The Role of Upstream-Downstream Competition on Bundling Decisions: Should Regulators Force Firms to Unbundle ?
- Creators
- Adam D. Rennhoff - Middle Tennessee State UniversityKonstantinos Serfes - Drexel University
- Publication Details
- Journal of economics & management strategy, v 18(2), pp 547-588
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Number of pages
- 42
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Economics (School of Economics)
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:000265709500008
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-65449188252
- Other Identifier
- 991019168667904721
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- Collaboration types
- Domestic collaboration
- Web of Science research areas
- Economics
- Management