Files and links (1)
SubmittedOpen Access (License Unspecified), Open
Journal article
VOTING FOR INCOME-IMMISERIZING REDISTRIBUTION IN THE MELTZER-RICHARD MODEL
Economic inquiry, v 52(2), pp 682-695
01 Apr 2014
Featured in Collection : UN Sustainable Development Goals @ Drexel
Abstract
This paper argues that income received via redistributive transfers, unlike labor income, requires no direct sacrifice of leisure; this makes it attractive to many voters even if it leaves them poorer. This point is made within the classic model wherein heterogeneous voters evaluate an income-redistribution program that finances a lump-sum transfer to all via a distorting income tax. The political-equilibrium policy under majority rule is the tax most preferred, utility-wise, by the median voter. Ironically, this voter, and many poorer voters, may support a redistribution policy that leaves them poorer in income terms but with higher utility.
Metrics
5 Record Views
Details
- Title
- VOTING FOR INCOME-IMMISERIZING REDISTRIBUTION IN THE MELTZER-RICHARD MODEL
- Creators
- Richard C. Barnett - Drexel UniversityJoydeep Bhattacharya - Iowa State UniversityHelle Bunzel - Iowa State University
- Publication Details
- Economic inquiry, v 52(2), pp 682-695
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Number of pages
- 14
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Economics (School of Economics)
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:000331795900013
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-84894470372
- Other Identifier
- 991019168092004721
UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
This publication has contributed to the advancement of the following goals:
InCites Highlights
Data related to this publication, from InCites Benchmarking & Analytics tool:
- Collaboration types
- Domestic collaboration
- Web of Science research areas
- Economics