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Journal article
Wage offers and on-the-job search
The Canadian journal of economics, v 55(1), pp 74-105
08 Apr 2022
Featured in Collection : UN Sustainable Development Goals @ Drexel
Abstract
We study the wage-setting problem of an employer with private information about demand for its product when workers can engage in costly on-the-job search. Employers understand that low wage offers may convey bad news that induces workers to search. The unique perfect sequential equilibrium wage strategy is characterized by: (i) pooling by intermediate-revenue employers on a common wage that just deters search, (ii) discontinuously lower revealing offers by low-revenue employers for whom the benefit of deterring search fails to warrant the required high pooling wage and (iii) high revealing offers by high-revenue employers seeking to deter aggressive raiders.
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Details
- Title
- Wage offers and on-the-job search
- Creators
- Tristan Potter - Drexel Univ, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USADan Bernhardt - Univ Illinois, Chicago, IL 60680 USA
- Publication Details
- The Canadian journal of economics, v 55(1), pp 74-105
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Number of pages
- 32
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Economics (School of Economics)
- Web of Science ID
- WOS:000782145700001
- Scopus ID
- 2-s2.0-85128671102
- Other Identifier
- 991019167594604721
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- Collaboration types
- Domestic collaboration
- International collaboration
- Web of Science research areas
- Economics